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COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RELIGIOUS AND CONSCIENTIOUS FREEDOM
CALCULATIONS OF CONSCIENCE:
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
RELIGIOUS AND CONSCIENTIOUS FREEDOM
HOWARD KISLOWICZ,* RICHARD HAIGH,
AND ADRIENNE NG***
This article examines the Supreme Court of
Canada's cost-benefit analysis of freedom of
conscience and religion guaranteed by s. 2(a) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Alberta v.
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. The articlefinds
that while the Supreme Court's reasoning was
ultimately flawed, its use of cost-benefit analysis may
be a positive development in the freedom of religion
framework. The article also looks at the Court's
treatment of the freedom of conscience guarantee in
relation to freedom of religion. The article suggests
that this treatment may foreshadow a more uniform
approach to the broader freedom of conscience and
religion than was provided for in previous decisions.
Cet article examine l'analyse coiits-avantages de la
libertg de conscience et de religion de la Cour supreme
du Canada garantie par 'article 2(a) de la Charte
canadienne des droits et libertis dans Alberta c.
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. Cet article
estime que bien que le raisonnement de la Cour
suprdmefit en definitive sans fondement, I'utilisation
de l'analyse coiits-avantages peut tre un
ddveloppement positif dans le cadre de la libertd de
religion. L'article examine aussi la manihre dont la
cour a traite la garantie de la libertd de conscience
relativement h la libertd de religion. L 'article donne 6i
penser que ce traitement peut laisser prisager une
approche plus uniforme b une plus grande libertd de
conscience et de religion que ce qui avait &t privu
dans les d&isions antirieures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a well-respected, reasonably intelligent mohel in Toronto. He has been
performing circumcisions at bris ceremonies for many years, without a single problem. He
also knows many other mohels, all professional, all well-regarded in their communities. None
of them have had any problems either. The practice is well-known among the Jewish
community. It has been performed at bris ceremonies for hundreds of years, and it functions
on many different levels: as social, historical, and cultural practice, as creating and
generating community, and as a response to physical health and welfare concerns.
The government then announces dramatic changes to the Regulated Health Professions
Act, 1991.' Whereas before, s. 27(3) ofthe Act allowed certain exemptions to the requirement
that no one except authorized health professionals shall perform "controlled acts" 2 (for
example, in cases such as "[m]ale circumcision ... performed as part of a religious tradition
or ceremony"'), the new government initiative states that henceforth, no exceptions to male
circumcision are permitted. Section 9, and all other sections of the regulations that define the
exemptions permitted by s. 27(3) of the Act, are removed. Now only doctors can perform
circumcisions. On what basis? There is growing evidence that certain previously exempt
controlled acts (such as "the taking of a blood sample from a vein,"4 or "[t]attooing for
cosmetic purposes"') have led to health risks. However, no evidence exists that circumcisions
performed by mohels are causing problems. The government cites a growing number of
health problems across the country as reason for bringing all health practices back "inside"
the medical profession. These problems may be genuine concerns, but none of them relate
to the practice of circumcision by mohels. The government states that other provinces are
contemplating eliminating exemptions for so-called non-medical professionals as an attempt
to universalize practices and stop certain alternative health practitioners from moving to the
least restrictive jurisdictions and plying their trades there. Again, no evidence exists that
mohels are moving anywhere. Nor are mohels in Toronto concerned with what is happening
in British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, or, indeed, the United States.
Our reasonably intelligent mohel might wonder how the government can justify such a
seemingly blatant attack on a previously extant religious freedom. After all, he had been
performing the service for over 30 years without any problems whatsoever. And his small
circle of mohel friends, all 300 of them in and around the City of Toronto, had been doing
likewise, all without a single incident. He may even think that tattoo artists and lab
technicians who take blood samples should be controlled further because he has read about
some customers and patients suffering terrible infections and diseases from poor needle
practices. But, in his view, mohels are different. Their rituals are centuries old. No one comes
to them as a walk-in off the street, or for a quick circumcision.
S.O. 1991, c. 18.
Ibid, s. 27.
3 ControlledActs, 0. Reg. 107/96, s. 9.
4 Ibid., s. 11.
5 Ibid, s. 8.
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It is not a perfect analogy, but the Hutterites of Wilson Colony in Alberta must feel
something similar to our imaginary mohel. Previously, Hutterites were granted an exemption
from the photographic requirement on driver's licences due to their religious beliefs. In 2003,
Alberta adopted new regulations that made photographs on driver's licences mandatory for
everyone. The Alberta government told the Hutterites that the incidence of identity theft was
on the rise. They told them that the national (or even global) problem of identity theft
requires a one-size-fits-all approach. And they told them that since other provinces will soon
be adopting mandatory photo licence requirements, Alberta needs to stay with the pack for
fear of becoming a haven for identity thieves. We think that Alberta and the Supreme Court
of Canada, who accepted their justifications in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony, got it wrong.
The Wilson Colony decision provides an ideal platform from which to evaluate two
aspects of Canadian freedom of religion jurisprudence. First, the case is marked by a
strikingly clear use of cost-benefit analysis to resolve a dispute involving religion. We argue
that, although the majority's cost-benefit analysis is faulty in several important respects, the
adoption of a cost-benefit form of analysis may actually be a positive development in the
freedom of religion framework. Second, although this particular dispute focused on the
religious beliefs of a minority community, the Court's comments subtly draw in the
"conscience" aspect of s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms,' indicating
a more uniform approach to the broader freedom of conscience and religion than has been
suggested in some past decisions. We take this as an opportunity to carefully think through
the guarantee of freedom of conscience, arguing that there is no principled reason that
matters of conscience should be treated differently from matters of religious belief and
practice. In fact, freedom of conscience may act to open up judicial dialogue and allow
judges room to decide moral matters on bases distinct from religious ones. We will analyze
each of these issues in turn once we have provided the necessary background to this
particular dispute.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Since 1974, Alberta has required all driver's licences to bear a photograph of the licence
holder.8 Those who objected to having their photo taken on religious grounds or who suffered
from a temporary medical condition that affected their appearance were exempted from such
a requirement and were granted a non-photo licence - called a Condition Code G (Code G)
licence - at the Registrar's discretion.'
A little over half of the Code G licence holders in Alberta were members of Hutterian
Brethren colonies. The Hutterites are religious groups that maintain "a rural, communal
lifestyle, carrying on a variety of commercial activities."o While not all Hutterites are of the
same view, members of the Wilson Colony are against having their photograph taken. They
6 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 [Wilson Colony (S.C.C.)].
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[Charter].
Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at para. 1.
Operator Licensing and Vehicle Control Regulation, Alta. Reg. 320/2002, s. 14(1)(b).10 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at para. 2.
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sincerely believe that the Second Commandment (which states: "You shall not make for
yourself an idol, or any likeness of what is in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the
water under the earth" (Exodus 20:4))" prohibits them from having their photographs
willingly taken.
In 2003, the exemption was abolished. 2 The new driver's licensing system aims at
minimizing the identity theft and fraud associated with driver's licences. Every registered
motorist must have a digital photographic image taken. The photograph is placed in the
province's facial recognition databank. Facial recognition software then compares this
photograph to all others in the system, helping to ensure that the person obtaining or
renewing a licence is actually the named person on the licence and that "no one has more
than one licence in his or her name."" The Wilson Colony members challenged the universal
photo requirement as violating their constitutionally protected religious freedom and equality
rights. They claimed that the requirement would effectively prohibit Hutterites from holding
driver's licences, ultimately threatening the viability of their communal lifestyle.
Although the Hutterite faith stems from the same Anabaptist tradition as Amish and
Mennonite faiths, Hutterites do not forego all modem conveniences as do the Amish. In
particular, Hutterites rely on automobiles for travel. For instance, the Wilson Colony
members use motor vehicles to obtain medical services, for firefighting within the
community by volunteer firefighters, and in the commercial activities that sustain their
community. 4 The Alberta government had proposed a measure requiring a photograph of
each Hutterite driver, but keeping it sealed or only available on the system's databank (that
is, not available for general public viewing). The Wilson Colony objected to any photo being
taken whatsoever, proposing instead that photoless driver's licences be issued to them
marked "Not to be used for identification purposes."" This, they felt, would reduce the risk
of their licences becoming the targets of identity theft. The Alberta government rejected this
proposal. The Wilson Colony members then brought a Charter claim against the government.
At trial, LoVecchio J. proceeded on the basis that the universal photo requirement limited
the s. 2(a) rights of Wilson Colony members and concluded that this limit could not be
justified under s. I of the Charter." As is well known, there are two parts to any s. I
analysis. The first part examines whether the impugned provision is "prescribed by law." The
second part of a s. I analysis employs the test developed in R. v. Oakes." The Oakes test
consists of four criteria that must be satisfied in order to demonstrably justify that legislative
provisions are a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society: a pressing and substantial
objective, a rational connection between the legislation and its objective, minimal impairment
of the right of freedom, and proportionality between the effects of the measures responsible
for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective that has been identified as
I Ibid. at para. 29.
12 Operator Licensing and Vehicle Control Amendment Regulation, Alta. Reg. 137/2003, s. 3.
13 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at para. 120.
14 Ibid at para. 118.Is Ibid. at para. I3.
16 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2006 ABQB 338, 398 A.R. 5 at paras. 7, 33 [Wilson
Colony (Q.B.)].
17 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [Oakes].
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pressing and substantial." Justice LoVecchio defined the government's objective as being
the "prevention of identity theft" associated with driver's licences." While he found the
objective to be pressing and substantial, and the universal photo requirement of the
legislation to be rationally connected to the objective, he held that the requirement of
minimal impairment was not met. To him, the Wilson Colony's proposal would satisfy the
members' concerns and also meet the government's objectives, since an individual seeking
to impersonate the holder would be constrained by the express words limiting the licence's
use. 20
The Alberta government appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal. In a 2-1 split decision,
Conrad J.A. for the majority found that the limit on the Wilson Colony's s. 2(a) rights could
not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.2 1 Justice Conrad defined the government's
objectives narrowly as (1) preventing one individual from acquiring two licences, and (2)
ensuring that each individual acquires a licence in his or her actual name.22 While she found
that the legislative objectives were pressing and substantial, she expressed doubt as to
whether the universal photo requirement was rationally connected to the objectives. Justice
Conrad, however, disposed of the case on the ground that the universal photo requirement
did not minimally impair the right. 23 To her, "the impugned regulation offers only a very
slight protection against the risk that a licence will be issued to an individual in a name other
than his or her own, while completely infringing the respondents' rights."24
In dissent, Slatter J.A. found that the regulation could be justified under s. 1 of the
Charter. He defined the objectives much more broadly, as encompassing public safety,
preventing misuse of driver's licences and identity theft, and ensuring the integrity of the
licensing system.25 Thus, when he proceeded through the Oakes test to the minimal
impairment stage, Slatter J.A. concluded that any further accommodation by the government
"would require it to significantly compromise a central feature of the security ofthe licencing
system, and would amount to undue hardship." 26 At the final, proportionate effects stage of
the analysis, Slatter J.A. observed that the members of Wilson Colony objected only to
having their photos taken voluntarily, and suggested that this religious tenet was not at odds
with the state compulsion implied by the photo requirement.27
The Alberta government then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court's
decision consists of a single majority judgment (McLachlin C.J.C. on behalf of a majority
of four judges) upholding the regulation and two separate dissenting judgments (Abella and
LeBel JJ. opined separately, and Fish J. rendered a single sentence dissenting decision
concurring with both Abella and LeBel JJ.). Given that the government admitted that s. 2(a)
of the Charter was infringed, all seven judges glossed over the nature of the limit on the
fundamental freedom of religion (although there were a few interesting parenthetical
I8 Ibid
'9 Wilson Colony (Q.B.), supra note 16 at para. 14.
20 Ibid. at para. 28.
21 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2007 ABCA 160,417 A.R. 68 [ Wilson Colony (C.A.)].
22 Ibid. at para. 30.
23 Ibid. at para. 42.
24 Ibid. at para. 46.
25 Ibid at paras. 92, 97.
26 Ibid at para. 124.
27 Ibid. at para. 126.
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remarks, which we discuss in Part IV, below). The disagreement centred on whether such
infringement could be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. More specifically, the root of the
disagreement involved the last two steps of the s. 1 analysis: minimal impairment and
proportionality of effects.
Chief Justice McLachlin opened her s. 1 analysis with significant deference to the
government. She acknowledged that legislative schemes are complex and that, because of
this, "a measure of leeway must be accorded to governments in determining whether limits
on rights in public programs that regulate social and commercial interactions are justified
under s. 1 of the Charter."28 She also pointed out that these complex legislative schemes may
often conflict with the broad scope of s. 2(a).29
In the first step of the s. 1 analysis, McLachlin C.J.C. noted that while the impugned
regulations were adopted without any legislative debate, they were considered to be
"prescribed by law" under s. I of the Charter.30 The Chief Justice then found that the
government's justifications easily met the Oakes test. In determining whether the law had a
pressing and substantial objective, McLachlin C.J.C. relied on the broad formulation of
Slatter J.A.'s dissent regarding the importance of minimizing identity theft, but refrained it
as pertaining to the driver's licensing system only, not as a more general policy protecting
all Albertans. She then concluded that maintaining the integrity of the driver's licensing
system in a way that minimizes the risk of identity theft is "clearly a goal of pressing and
substantial importance."" With respect to whether the law was rationally connected to the
objective, McLachlin C.J.C. relied on the evidence of Joseph Mark Pendleton, Director of
the Special Investigations Unit of the Alberta Ministry of Government Services (SIU), to
establish that the universal photo requirement is rationally connected to its goal of protecting
the integrity of the driver's licensing system and preventing it from being used for purposes
of identity theft.32 As to whether the law minimally impaired the rights of the Wilson Colony
members, McLachlin C.J.C. again accorded the legislature a measure of deference, noting
that, on complex social issues, legislatures may be better positioned than the courts to choose
among a range of alternatives: "We must take the government's goal as it is."" She stated
that all other alternatives - including the one proposed by the Wilson Colony - would
compromise the province's objective of minimizing the risk of misuses of driver's licences
for identity theft.34 Thus, she concluded that the universal photo requirement minimally
impairs the s. 2(a) rights of Colony members. Finally, the majority held that the benefits of
the legislation outweighed its detrimental effects, finding three salutary effects and only one
deleterious effect. The crucial positive effect was the enhancement of the security or integrity
of the driver's licensing scheme,3 s which stacks up against the key negative effect which was
that Colony members would be forced to make alternative arrangements for highway
transport. Although the majority acknowledged that the impacts ofthis latter effect, including
28 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at para. 35.
29 Ibid. at para. 36.
3o Ibid. at paras. 39-40.
" Ibid at para. 42.
32 Ibid. at paras. 50-52. For further discussion of Pendleton's affidavit, see infra notes 96-102 and
accompanying text.
3 Ibid at para. 63.
34 Ibid. at para. 60.
3s Ibid. at para. 80.
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the financial costs and a departure from the Colony's self-sufficiency, were not trivial, it
viewed this as not seriously affecting the Colony members' right to practice their religion.36
Justice Abella rendered the most thoroughly reasoned dissent. For her, the majority's
reasoning begins to fall apart at the minimal impairment analysis and "fully flounders"" at
the proportionality stage. In the minimal impairment analysis, Abella J. referred to the
Colony's proposal to have photoless driver's licences coupled with a statement that the
licence is not to be used for identification purposes. Although the majority rejected this
proposal on the grounds that it would "significantly compromise the government's
objective,"38 Abella J. found no cogent or persuasive evidence that such drastic interference
would actually occur.
According to Abella J., even if one could accept that the government did not unreasonably
impair the Wilson Colony's religious freedom, the negative effects ofthe legislation severely
outweighed the positive effects. The benefit of adding approximately 250 photographs of
Hutterites who may wish to drive is, on the one hand, only marginally useful to the
prevention of identity theft." On the other hand, the absence of an exemption for Hutterites
is dramatic and harsh, as it forces members to make a choice between two evils: giving up
the self-sufficiency of their community, or driving illegally.40
For the most part, LeBel J. agreed with Abella J.'s reasoning. One of his specific concerns
was how the majority treated the governmental objective. To him, independent judicial
assessment is important, noting that a "stated objective is not an absolute and should not be
treated as a given. Moreover, alternative solutions should not be evaluated on a standard of
maximal consistency with the stated objective."41 A court must assess "the objectives, the
impugned means and the alternative means together, as necessary components of a seamless
proportionality analysis."42
The case reverses a tendency of the Supreme Court of Canada to hold that religious
freedoms warrant strong constitutional protection under s. 2(a).43 What makes it different
from a series of precedents favouring a diversity of religious groups and views? Is the Court
36 Ibid. at paras. 97-99.
3 lbid at para. 150.
38 Ibid. at para. 146 [emphasis omitted].
3 Ibid. at para. 158.
40 Ibid. at para. 163. For further discussion, see infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
41 Ibid. at para. 195.
42 Ibid. at para. 199.
43 Based on a survey of Supreme Court freedom of religion cases, the last Supreme Court of Canada case
to uphold government legislation purely on the basis that it did not infringe religious freedom was R.
v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [Edwards Books]. In the recent case of A.C. v.
Manitoba (Director ofChildandFamily Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181 the Court upheld
legislation that allowed a court to order medical treatment where it is in the best interests of the child -
the legislation was challenged partly on the basis that it infringed s. 2(a) of the Charter; however, the
majority's primary focus was based on s. 7, devoting only two paragraphs to the analysis under s. 2(a).
We recognize that the survey is open to critique: there have been other cases where a religious freedom
claim was not accepted - see e.g. Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607; Young v.
Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 - but we do not count cases such as these where there are competing
constitutional rights at stake, or where the matter is determined on administrative law grounds or is
effectively a private one involving legislative provisions such as the "best interests of the child." Our
main point remains: Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), ibid. reverses the trend to accept religious practices that
run up against laws of general application.
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now calculating religious freedom differently? We try to make sense of this in the next Part
of this article.
III. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FREEDOM OF
RELIGION CASES: CALCULATING BELIEF
Under the "proportionality" branch of the Oakes test (which, incidentally, the Court notes
is viewed by Peter Hogg as a redundant duplication of the "pressing and substantial
objective" branch)," the judgments in Wilson Colony examine and weigh the "salutary" and
"deleterious" effects of the photo requirement.45 Through this language, both the majority
and the dissent employ a cost-benefit analysis in support of their conclusions. Though this
form of analysis has appeared in religious freedom cases before,46 it has rarely been set out
as starkly, and seldom have the religious concerns of one group of citizens been seen as less
weighty than the non-religious concerns of other citizens or government actors. The Court's
willingness to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, a familiar form to economists, invites two
kinds of questions: (1) is this an appropriate form of analysis for freedom of religion cases?
and (2) did the Court get the analysis right in this case? We deal with each question in turn.
A. IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS APPROPRIATE IN
FREEDOM OF RELIGION CASES?
It may seem odd to subject belief-based acts to the numerical strictures of a cost-benefit
analysis. In their article "An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom," Michael
McConnell and Richard Posner, proponents of using cost-benefit analysis in religious
freedom cases, admit that "[r]eligious reasoning and religious faith may seem antithetical to
economic reasoning and values; religious freedom may seem unquantifiable even in principle
and therefore beyond the reach of any economic or socio-scientific metric."47 Indeed, at least
one commentator finds the "utilitarian" nature of the reasoning problematic.48 In light of this,
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have recently offered a more comprehensive
critique of a "balancing" approach to religious freedom cases.49 They focus on the American
legal test, which requires a compelling state interest to justify encroachments on religious
4 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), ibid. at para. 75, citing Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 5th ed.,
supp., vol. 2, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) at s. 38.12.
45 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), ibid. at paras. 72-99, McLachlin C.J.C., at paras. 150-76, Abella J., dissenting,
at para. 200, LeBel J., dissenting.
4 See e.g. SyndicatNorthcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 at paras. 82-85 [Amselem].
There, the Supreme Court addressed an appeal by Orthodox Jewish condominium co-owners who
wished to install succahs (ritual huts) on their balconies for nine days per year, in apparent contravention
of the building's bylaws and declaration. The Court weighed the "aesthetic, economic, and security
interests" asserted by the condominium syndicate against the religious freedom interests asserted by the
appellants (at para. 83). In undertaking this analysis, the Court effectively held that the true cost (or
"harm") to the syndicate was minimal as compared to the religious liberty interests of the appellants (at
para. 103).
47 Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom"
(1989) 56 U. Chicago L. Rev. I at 2.
48 Jennifer Koshan, "Security Trumps Freedom of Religion for Hutterite Drivers" ABlawg (10 August
2009), online: The University of Calgary Faculty of Law Blog on Developments in Alberta Law <http://
ablawg.ca/2009/08/1 0/security-trumps-freedom-of-religion-for-hutterite-drivers/>.
49 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007) at 81-87.
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freedom." While this test was eventually discarded by the U.S. Supreme Court in favour of
one that upholds laws that burden religion but are "neutral and generally applicable,"" there
have been legislative attempts at both federal and state levels to revive the "compelling state
interest" standard.52 Eisgruber and Sager view the balancing approach suggested by the
"compelling state interest" test to be indeterminate and prone to ad hoc behaviour by judges.
This is so, they argue, because the balancing approach rests on no "coherent normative
foundation."s3
As an alternative, Eisgruber and Sager propose a theory of "equal liberty." Basically
described, this theory insists on three tenets. First, no one should be devalued on account of
their spiritual beliefs. Second, there is no constitutional reason to treat religion as deserving
of special benefits. Third, all persons, regardless of their religious or non-religious
viewpoints, are entitled to equal rights of "free speech, personal autonomy, associative
freedom, and private property that, while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor defined
in terms of religion, will allow religious practice to flourish."54
There are, nonetheless, powerful arguments for maintaining the cost-benefit analysis that
the Supreme Court uses (albeit, in our view, imperfectly") in Wilson Colony. First, given the
balancing role of s. I of Charter, it might be hard for judges to avoid engaging in a balancing
approach or a cost-benefit analysis. Though the s. I test is called by other names in Canada,
it is really just the compelling state interest test in modified form. The weighing of state
interests inheres in the rational connection, minimal impairment, and proportionality stages
of the Oakes test." Most prominently, when the courts weigh the salutary and deleterious
effects of government action, the salutary effects will reflect the state's interest. The
comparison of the salutary effects to the action's deleterious effects will determine whether
the state interest is sufficiently compelling. This is now a firmly established part of Canada's
s. 1 jurisprudence in cases dealing with religious freedom and other constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada has demonstrated, as well, the ability to integrate the
comparative analysis of the kind recommended by Eisgruber and Sager with an evaluation
of the state's justifications. The Court has simultaneously compared a claimant's position
with other religious and non-religious viewpoints while also weighing the benefits of state
action against the seriousness of its encroachment on religious practices. Multani v.
5o This test emerged in the American jurisprudence from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
[Sherbert], a case discussed in more detail below (infra note 79 and following) involving the denial of
unemployment benefits to a woman who had been fired because she refused to work on Saturdays for
religious reasons.
s' See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which upheld the denial of unemployment
benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs on the basis of their ceremonial use of peyote.
52 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). In his article "Theology
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the
Liberty" (2004) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 155 at 211, Douglas Laycock reports that, at that time, 12 state
legislatures had adopted similar Acts, and that Alabama had put a similar provision into its state
constitution. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1493-1493.02 (West 2004); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
52-57 1b (West Supp. 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 761.01-.05 (West Supp. 2004); Ala. Const. amend. 622.
See also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49 at 46-47.
5 Eisgruber & Sager, ibid. at 85.
5 Ibid. at 53 [footnote omitted].
5 See Part IlI.C, below.
6 Oakes, supra note 17; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [ 1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.
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Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoyss? provides an excellent example. There, a
Quebec school board's rule that prohibited weapons detrimentally affected the religious
freedom of a Sikh student who wished to wear a kirpan (ceremonial dagger). The Court
reasoned that the school board did not in fact apply a policy of absolute safety, but one of
reasonable safety, as it allowed students to use potentially dangerous objects such as
"scissors, compasses, baseball bats and table knives in the cafeteria," and did not install
metal detectors in schools." As such, the blanket prohibition on kirpans was seen as out of
step with the school's policy. This unequal application of the no-weapons policy at once
showed the discriminatory effects on Sikh students and undermined the school board's
argument that it had a compelling interest in upholding the ban, which would have been
consistent with a policy of absolute safety but not with one of reasonable safety. Thus, the
consideration of the state's interest in a particular form of regulation did not prove
unworkable in the context of a s. 1 analysis of religious freedom.
Furthermore, perhaps unexpectedly, perspectives on how best to deal with social diversity
may end up supporting the kind of cost-benefit analysis advocated by McConnell and Posner.
In her book Making All the Diference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law, Martha
Minow argues for a fundamental change in how legal thought constructs and understands
differences between people.59 One of the most fundamental difficulties in the legal treatment
of claims from minority populations, she posits, is that differences between people are often
attributed to the minority community. In other words, the majority group is "normal" and the
minority group is burdened with "difference." Minow argues that all difference is relative;
you are only as different from me as I am from you. As such, difference is actually best
understood as "as a pervasive feature of communal life.""o When this view is adopted,
disagreements about the accommodation ofdifferences in religious practices take new shape:
"Accommodation of religious practices may look nonneutral, but failure to accommodate
may also seem nonneutral by burdening the religious minority whose needs were not built
into the structure of mainstream institutions."" The most appropriate role for institutions of
justice, in Minow's view, is to "consider ways to structure social institutions to distribute the
burdens attached to difference."62
Minow's views inspire a new vantage point from which to re-evaluate entrenched
practices and preferences, with an eye towards a more effective distribution of justice.
Though Minow may not have intended her approach to support the use of cost-benefit
analysis, she nonetheless insists that it is unfair for minority groups to bear the full costs of
difference, and that the most just solution is one that reshapes institutions such that the costs
5 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 [Multani].
5 Ibid at para. 46.
59 Martha Minow, Making All the Diference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1990).
6 Ibid. at 11. Significantly, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 24, articulates
the same view; its preamble states that "the Government ofCanada recognizes the diversity ofCanadians
as regards race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic ofCanadian
society." The same view is arguably restated in the body of the Act, which states that "multiculturalism
is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity" (s. 3(1)(b)). Further, in speaking
in favour of the Act, Hon. Gerry Weiner (Minister of State (Multiculturalism)) said: "This Bill deals with
relationships among Canadians, about a fundamental characteristic of Canada": House of Commons
Debates, No. 14 (11 July 1988) at 17385.
61 Minow, ibid. at 43.
62 Ibid at II [footnote omitted].
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of difference are distributed more evenly. The justice of such a distribution is supported by
the view that all difference is relative; if difference does not belong to one group, but is rather
a pervasive characteristic of an entire society, there is little fairness in concentrating the costs
of that difference with specific minority groups. Inevitably, any redistribution of the costs
of difference will lead to some form of new costs for dominant groups. Those who disagree
with Minow will argue that taxpayers should not be made to shoulder the extra burdens
associated with people's particularities. In this vein, the majority decision in Wilson Colony
states that "[m]any religious practices entail costs which society reasonably expects the
adherents to bear."" But, as Minow astutely observes and the Supreme Court admits, the
costs of treating all people fairly always persist; the only real question is who bears them.
The view of both Minow and the Supreme Court, in other words, requires an assessment of
the various costs and benefits of religious freedom in particular situations. The real difference
is in assessing the fairness of the unequal distribution of costs. This leads to differences in
determining what kinds of government interests are sufficiently compelling to justify limits
on freedom of religion, but not to a wholesale rejection of a cost-benefit analysis.
Perhaps the least explored potential advantage of using cost-benefit analysis as part of
legal doctrine is that it may promote compromise by encouraging a thorough and detailed
consideration of the costs of difference by the parties. Religious freedom claims can
sometimes evolve into a "winner take all" framework. When negotiations break down
between the parties and they prepare for litigation, they may come to see the potential
outcome of the case as an all or nothing scenario: either the claimants have a protected right,
or they do not. On the other hand, a cost-benefit framework encourages parties to enumerate
all the costs and benefits of a particular government action; if parties know that the courts
will conduct a cost-benefit analysis, there will be an incentive for each to provide a thorough,
itemized accounting. When disputes are framed in this fashion, we think, parties can envisage
more potential trade-offs and more bases on which to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions.
The view that legal doctrines provide a framework within which litigants may settle their
disputes is not novel. In the 1970s, using divorce law as a case study, Robert Mnookin and
Lewis Kornhauser famously observed that parties to a legal dispute negotiate settlements "in
the shadow of the law."' Legal rights, on this theory, create bargaining endowments that
parties can trade in order to arrive at a negotiated settlement. Following on this insight, we
suggest that when a single, unclearly defined endowment is at stake (for example, the right
to religious freedom conditioned by s. I of the Charter), parties have less room to achieve
a negotiated settlement because the number of potential trade-offs is diminished. This limits
the range of potential compromise solutions.
This does not mean, however, that no compromises are possible. In both Amselemes and
Multani, the Supreme Court noted some potential solutions that arose through negotiations
but were eventually rejected by the parties. In Amselem, the conflict centred on whether an
Orthodox Jewish resident of a condominium style complex could erect a succah (ceremonial
hut) on a balcony, in apparent contravention of the building's bylaws. The condominium
63 Supra note 6 at para. 95.
64 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce"
(1979) 88 Yale L.J. 950 at 968.
65 Supra note 46.
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syndicate proposed that Mr. Amselem and his co-appellants erect a communal succah in the
condominium's gardens but, ultimately, Amselem and his co-appellants elected to pursue the
litigation instead. 6 Indeed, the dissenting judges stressed that Amselem had, for a time,
responded positively to this offer; the dissenting judges agreed with the Quebec Superior
Court and Court of Appeal that this was the most reasonable solution to the dispute.
Similarly, in Multani, the Court underscored the fact that Gurbaj Singh Multani had agreed,
as a form of compromise, to wear his kirpan under specified conditions, but the school board
would not accede to the compromise and continued its litigation. In both Amselem and
Multani, however, the compromise solutions failed, and litigation ensued. Interestingly, the
Supreme Court's remedy in Multani ultimately endorsed the initial compromise struck
between Multani's family and his school. This could be taken to argue against our notion that
religious freedom litigation (and other rights-based claims) can escalate into winner take all
disputes. But it is our position that once litigation begins, the conception of possible
outcomes shifts from a range of possibilities to a set of binary, mutually exclusive, results:
victory or loss. This, in turn, can lead parties to adopt entrenched positions, and make them
less open to hearing the compromises proposed by the other side. An approach that divides
disputes into smaller sub-issues and analyzes them in terms of the costs borne by all parties
may be a more fruitful way of fostering dialogue and stimulating creative solutions at
moments of conflict.69
While we cannot say for certain that this approach would have worked for the Alberta
government and the Wilson Colony, it may have opened up avenues of dialogue with the
Wilson Colony members (and still could on a continuing basis). For example, if the province
and the Colony members had spoken frankly about the potential costs to the Wilson Colony
of outsourcing their transportation, perhaps a financial compromise could have been found.
The province may have been willing to finance some or all of these added costs in order to
avoid the risks of taking the matter to court. Likewise, if the province had enumerated the
particular costs associated with a potential exemption, the Colony may have been willing to
participate in offsetting them. The solutions may not have been acceptable to the Wilson
Colony members, who attach religious significance to their self-sufficiency, or may not have
had the means to offer an acceptable offset to the province. In any event, however, a real
conversation could have occurred where the parties could have discussed whether these were
practicable options, and this may in turn have led to more creative solutions. A
comprehensive negotiation on all points seems a better option than seeing Colony members
abandon Alberta and move elsewhere to find a more hospitable and tolerable place.
" Ibid. at paras. 13-14, 176.
67 Ibid. at paras. 177-78.
68 Supra note 57 at paras. 3-5.
69 The idea of dividing matters into smaller sub-matters is proposed for quite different purposes in Ayelet
Shachar's Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women 's Rights (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2001). Shachar argues that if states and cultural communities splitjurisdiction of matters, this could encourage both to be more responsive to the needs of their
constituents. The idea we propose is inspired by Shachar's work, but differs in that we propose that by
breaking disputes involving religion down into their constituent costs, states, non-state actors, and
minority communities may be able to come more easily to negotiated settlements.
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B. WHAT IS THE PROPER COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
IN FREEDOM OF RELIGION CASES?
If the employment of cost-benefit analysis in religious freedom doctrine can be helpful in
encouraging settlement, it remains to be seen how best to conduct such an analysis.
McConnell and Posner offer a sophisticated picture ofthe relevant considerations in applying
cost-benefit analysis to questions of religious freedom.70 They write that the important first
step in conducting a cost-benefit analysis is establishing a baseline from which to assess
whether a cost or benefit (often described as a "tax" or a "subsidy") has been imposed. One
can only determine whether a tax has been levied or a subsidy has been provided in
comparison to what the affected parties' position would be in the absence of the particular
government action.7'
Often, economic analysis uses the baseline of efficiency in order to assess government
regulation. In an efficiency-based model, taxes or subsidies are only justified to the extent
that the net benefit of the tax or subsidy outweighs its net cost. Writing in the American
context, where the First Amendment guarantees religious freedom and prohibits governments
from establishing a particular religion,72 McConnell and Posner show that there are
fundamental problems with using an efficiency-based model in approaching religious issues.
First, such a model could end up favouring the establishment of a particular religion: "For
example, if it could be shown that inculcating public school students with the tenets of the
Mormon faith would produce net social benefits, perhaps in the form of a more orderly and
productive citizenry, such inculcation would be permitted."" Second, the same kind of
analysis could favour a direct ban on a particular religious activity or a religion if it could be
shown that the aggregate disutility of the religion to society outweighed its benefits to
adherents. Though the Canadian constitutional guarantee of religious freedom is worded
differently these concerns would apply equally in Canada, where legislation motivated by
considerations particular to a specific religious tradition has been invalidated74 and the
banning of specific religious practices would seem antithetical to the guarantee of
conscientious and religious freedom enshrined in s. 2(a) of the Charter.
Thus, efficiency must be discarded as a baseline for evaluation. Instead, the most
appropriate baseline for resolving questions of religious freedom is, as McConnell and
Posner argue, "neutrality."s By this they mean that religious institutions and activities ought
to be compared with non-religious institutions and activities in order to engage in a proper
cost-benefit analysis. Thus, "a regulation is not neutral in an economic sense if, whatever its
normal scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes greater costs on religious than on
70 Supra note 47. But see Jeremy Webber, "The Irreducibly Religious Content of Freedom of Religion"
in Avigail Eisenberg, ed., Diversity and Equality: The Changing Framework of Freedom in Canada
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 178 at 184-85. As a critique of McConnell and Posner's view, Webber
argues that McConnell and Posner's attempt to use "neutrality" as a baseline for analysis ultimately
reveals the distinctive qualities of religion, because religious beliefs and practices are given special, and
not neutral, consideration. In this article, we take as given that religious and conscientious beliefs and
practices require particular treatment because they are singled out for constitutional protection.
7 McConnell & Posner, ibid. at 7.
72 U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof').
7 Supra note 47 at 9.
74 See R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd., [ 1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [Big M].
7 Supra note 47 at 10-12.
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comparable nonreligious activities."" This approach actually shares much in common with
Eisgruber and Sager's "equal liberty" theory of religious freedom discussed above." This
may be somewhat surprising given Eisgruber and Sager's opposition to balancing-type
approaches. However, like McConnell and Posner, Eisgruber and Sager's view is
fundamentally comparative; both views use the comparison of religious to non-religious
activities as a litmus test.78
The commonalities between the Eisgruber and Sager view and the McConnell and Posner
view can be seen in the comparable results they each reach when analyzing Sherbert.7 1 In
that case, Mrs. Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, lost her job because she refused to work
on Saturday, and as a result was denied unemployment benefits on the basis that she
"voluntarily" left her job." In this context McConnell and Posner write: "The choices open
to Mrs. Sherbert were two: declare her 'availability' for work on Saturdays and receive
benefits, or refuse and be denied them. The substitution effect [that is, the provision of an
incentive to change one's religious practices] is plain.""1 Put otherwise, the system imposed
a tax on religious adherents who celebrated a Saturday Sabbath that was not levied against
others. Eisgruber and Sager are also concerned with inequalities, but focus on another aspect
at play in Sherbert: South Carolina's law contained an exemption for those who worshipped
on Sundays, but not Saturday Sabbatarians.82 Thus, the law discriminated between religions.
Both the McConnell and Posner and the Eisgruber and Sager lines of reasoning support the
result reached by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the denial of benefits was
unconstitutional. Eisgruber and Sager's view, however, cannot explain why anyone should
be entitled to an exemption on the basis of their day of worship in the first place; if there had
been no exemption for Sunday worshippers, their approach would have supported an
opposite result. This, we think, does not take sufficient account of the special, obligation-
creating role that religion and other conscientious views have in shaping people's life
choices. Cost-benefit analysis, which compares costs experienced by religious persons with
those borne by non-religious persons, is more apt to consider the unique needs of religious
persons.
76 Ibid at 35. Compare Bruce Ryder, "The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship" in
Richard Moon, ed., Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 87 at 95.
Though he does not explicitly employ economic analysis, Ryder articulates the converse of this position
in offering his view of the Canadian conception of equal religious citizenship: "[T]he 'baseline' for
measuring state neutrality in Canada is the position of equal religious citizenship. Measures taken to
promote the capacity of religious believers to fully and equally participate in Canadian society are
consistent with state neutrality as long as they are extended in an even-handed manner to all adherents
of religious or conscientious belief systems."
7 See Part IILA, above. This may be somewhat surprising, as Eisgruber and Sager treat McConnell as one
oftheir principal detractors because, elsewhere, McConnell has approached the notion ofneutrality quite
differently: he argues that government action is neutral where it recreates a hypothetical world in which
individuals can make choices about their religion unaffected by the state. In yet another argument,
McConnell argues that religious and non-religious interests are fundamentally incomparable: see
Michael W. McConnell, "Religious Freedom at a Crossroads" (1992) 59 U. Chicago L. Rev. 115 at 169-
73; Michael W. McConnell, "The Problem of Singling Out Religion" (2000) 50 DePaul L. Rev. I at 35;
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49 at 27, 101.
7 See Eisgruber & Sager, ibid. at 53.
7 Supra note 50.
8o See ibid See also Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536. The question of
Sabbath observance was considered in the employment context, and the Court held that the employer
had an obligation of "reasonable accommodation" towards its employees before dismissing them.
Notably, however, this case arose out of a human rights claim, and not a claim based on the Charter right
to religious freedom.
si McConnell & Posner, supra note 47 at 40 [footnote omitted].82 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49 at 97.
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There are, however, important ambiguities in the cost-benefit analysis of the Sherbert
scenario. On one hand, before the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling, Sherbert was disadvantaged
because she paid into the unemployment insurance plan at the same rate as other employees,
but was unable to access her insurance benefits for reasons related to her religion. On the
other hand, after the ruling in Sherbert, Saturday Sabbatarians were insured against an
additional risk (the loss of employment for religious reasons). As additional risks are brought
within the scope of the insurance plan, the global cost of the insurance (and hence each
employee's contribution) rises. Non-religious employees, however, could never make a
successful claim for the loss of employment for religious reasons. Nonetheless, they are
required to shoulder a portion ofthe increased cost for the maintenance ofthe insurance plan.
Arguably, because they have little to no risk of losing their employment for religious reasons,
they bear a disproportionate amount of the plan's new cost.
Most religious freedom claims do not involve such complex ambiguities. Cases in which
"a burden that is imposed on everyone in society is particularly costly to the religious
person" are more common." McConnell and Posner cite the case of Menora v. Illinois High
School Association,84 in which a policy that prohibited the wearing of headgear during high
school basketball games imposed a particular hardship on Orthodox Jews who observe the
religious practice of keeping their heads covered. In economic terms, the "no-headgear" rule
created a disincentive to follow religious practices bearing disproportionately on the
religious. It made them pay more for safety than other players because, for other players, the
costs of observing the rule were trivial." In such cases, a cost-benefit analysis leads to the
conclusion that the legal outcome should depend upon the strength of the government
interest; the rule that imposes additional costs upon religious adherents can only be allowed
to stand if it is justified by a sufficiently compelling reason." In the Menora case, for
example, the high school would have to show that the safety concerns that allegedly
motivated the rule were real, and not merely trivial or speculative. A clear analogy can be
drawn here to Multani - as discussed above, a policy prohibiting kirpans in a high school,
which created a particular hardship for Sikh students, had to be analyzed in light of the
state's objectives.
C. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN WILSON COLONY
Though the Canadian and American freedom ofreligionjurisprudence differ significantly,
they share in common the principle that governments may not legislate for religious
purposes," and that, in principle, all are free to observe their religious practices provided that
they do not cause injury to others. Moreover, when McConnell and Posner wrote their article,
the "compelling state interest" test was still the law in the U.S. with respect to religious
freedom. In Canada, as seen above, a s. 1 analysis mandates a similar test. Accordingly,
McConnell and Posner's observations are instructive in the Canadian context.
8 McConnell & Posner, supra note 47 at 42.
8 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982) [Menora].
85 McConnell & Posner, supra note 47 at 43.
86 Ibid.
87 See Big M, supra note 74. See also Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board ofEducation (1988),65 O.R. (2d) 641
at 648 (C.A.); Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Ontario (Minister ofEducation) (1990), 71 OR. (2d)
341 (C.A.); Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town of) (1999), 47 O.R. (3d) 301 (C.A.).
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The cost-benefit analysis in Wilson Colony falls somewhere between an easy and a hard
case. From one perspective it resembles an easier case, where all people are required to pay
a cost (in this case, having one's picture taken) but the cost is experienced as trivial for most
but as high for members of a particular faith. In such a case, following McConnell and
Posner's analysis, the Court's task is to weigh the government's interest against the costs.
From another point of view, however, the case has some notable ambiguities. Public
highways and the driver's licensing system are supported by the tax contributions of all
residents, including, presumably, the members of Hutterian colonies. Any Albertan who
wishes to use the public highways lawfully must obtain a driver's licence, which now
requires a photograph to be taken of the licensee. If an exemption were made available to
Hutterites, they would be deriving a benefit not available to other Albertans: namely, that of
not having their photographs taken. This, in turn, would mean that their photographs would
not be included in the province's database. While, as the government argued, not being
included in the database increases the risk that one's identity could be misappropriated by
an impostor, it may also confer an advantage. Some people may fear that the security of the
provincial photo database could be compromised, and the photos and associated information
it contains used for nefarious purposes. Or, less practical but equally troubling, that the stored
digital photos represent a further decline in privacy and respect for one's own image. On this
theory, beneficiaries of the religious exemption are spared a cost that others are forced to
bear. Accordingly, their share of the financial burden required to maintain public highways
and a driver's licensing system is disproportionately low.
On balance, though, if the easier and harder cases are seen as lying at opposite ends of a
spectrum, the Wilson Colony case falls closer to the easier end. Most people would have no
objection to their photos being stored along with their other personal information in the
province's database - to our knowledge, this practice has raised no objections from the
overwhelming majority of Albertans. Following the guidelines discussed above, it remains
to be seen whether the Alberta government provided a sufficiently compelling interest to
override the religious freedom of the Hutterian Brethren.
Chief Justice McLachlin (for the majority) engaged in a fairly straightforward cost-benefit
analysis. Yet, two related aspects of the majority's analysis distort the cost-benefit calculus:
characterizing the province's regulatory goal very narrowly, and giving a high degree of
deference to the province on the efficacy of the universal photo requirement and the
unavailability of alternative measures. In so doing, the majority also ignores several factors
inherent in the driver's licensing system that are detrimental to its integrity, and fails to see
how risks to the integrity of the system posed by a photo exemption for Hutterite drivers is
exceedingly limited. We now turn to these issues.
I. THE MAJORITY'S FLAWED ANALYSIS: CALCULATING TECHNOLOGY
The majority viewed the province's regulatory goal as reducing identity theft as it relates
to the driver 's licensing system." In other words, the majority understood the legislative
measure not as one designed to reduce identity theft in general, but rather to specifically
reduce the identity theft associated with driver's licences. In terms of the s. I analysis, this
88 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at paras. 4, 9.
694 (2011) 48:3
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RELIGIOUS AND CONSCIENTIOUS FREEDOM
analytic manoeuvre effectively strips both the rational connection and minimal impairment
tests of their force. If the government's goal is to reduce the identity theft associated with
driver's licences, and the universal photo requirement is the only program in evidence that
will properly secure the driver's licence system, then the regulation can only be seen as
rational and minimally impairing the rights of the Hutterites. However, if the government's
goal is cast as reducing identity theft in general, the fact that 700,000 Albertans do not have
driver's licences" makes the program look less rational as it cannot possibly aid in protecting
the identities of this large number of Albertans. As for the minimal impairment test, in cost-
benefit terms, the taxes of the regulation are artificially minimized as the universal photo
requirement is deemed to be the least intrusive means available to accomplish the province's
goal. Admittedly, the majority does spend some time directly considering the costs of the
regulation on the Wilson Colony.o Still, the notion that the universal photo requirement is
the only way to achieve the government's goal (and thus the minimally intrusive way)
pervades the majority's analysis.91 In the same sentence that the majority states that the
regulation will prevent the Wilson Colony members from driving on the highway, it reminds
us that the regulation is "attempting to secure a social good for the whole of society - the
regulation of driver's licences in a way that minimizes fraud."92
Further, perhaps paradoxically, the majority's analysis invests the universal photo
requirement with all the benefits of reducing identity theft in general. The syllogism runs as
follows: identity theft is a major problem, driver's licences can be used for identity theft,
therefore securing the driver's licensing system is essential to reducing identity theft.93 But
there are crucial steps missing in this analysis. First, it is not clear how serious a problem
driver's licence-related identity theft actually is. Thus, it is difficult (if not impossible) to
gauge how much of an impact the universal photo requirement will have on identity theft in
general. At the very least, there seems to be a much greater concern, in Canada, with identity
theft through credit card fraud or stolen banking information.94
Second, it is not clear how effective the universal photo requirement will be. Although the
majority states that "the universal photo requirement enhances the security of the licensing
system and thus of Albertans,"" it does not consider whether there are vulnerabilities in the
system related to flaws in the software or human error in implementation. Instead, the
89 Ibid. at para. 158.
9 Ibid. at paras. 96-99.
91 Ibid at para. 197.
9 Ibid. at para. 96.
9 Ibid at paras. 9-11.
94 Statistics are very difficult to obtain. As the Court noted in Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), ibid. at para. 42,
driver's licences can be used as "breeder" documents for other kinds of fraud. Nevertheless, it is telling
that on the identity theft page of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada's website, "Identity
Theft: What it is and what you can do about it," online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/fs-fi/02 05_d_10 e.cfm>, there is only one reference to driver's licences and
that is under the heading "Are you a victim of identity theft?" where the last bullet point states that if
you are, you should obtain a new driver's licence. Most of the website is devoted to concerns over credit
and bank cards. Similarly, on the RCMP's website, a listing titled "Identity Theft and Identity Fraud,"
online: Royal Canadian Mounted Police <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/scams-fraudes/id-theft-vol-
eng.htm>, and a 2007 report on identity theft by RCMP Criminal Intelligence, Identity Fraudin Canada
- July 2007 (Ottawa: Criminal Intelligence, 2007), online: Royal Canadian Mounted Police
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/ci-rc/if-filif-fi-eng.pdf>, make only minimal references to driver's
licences as sources of fraud.
95 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), ibid. at para. 80.
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majority granted the province an exceptionally high degree of deference on evidentiary
issues.
Indeed, the majority relied heavily on the Alberta government's evidence, much of which
came from the testimony of Pendleton, the Director of the SIU. Pendleton's evidence is, at
the very least, interesting. To begin with, he aims his concerns mainly at the corporations
who "suffer" from defrauding, not the individuals who must reclaim their identity. "The term
'identity theft' is misleading," he says, "because the primary victim of an identity theft is ...
not the person whose identity is stolen ... [but] third parties who extend credit ... to an
impersonator who defrauds them."" It may be misleading, yet it remains the commonly used
term. The language is emotive - a victim of identity theft rightly evokes much sympathy.
Perhaps the Supreme Court relies on this "misleading" connotation in order to make its
ultimate finding more palatable to those who might feel their sympathy would otherwise lie
with a minority religious group rather than the corporate third party lender.
As to compelling evidence of the prevalence of identity theft, Pendleton provides a few
government reports and documents that are limited in their usefulness. For example, the
"Report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada and the
Attorney General of the United States" is full of generalizations and vague concerns:
There are indications identity theft is growing rapidly.
On the basis of available data, it appears that identity theft is likely to continue to grow substantially over
the next decade.
Canadian and United States law enforcement agencies are seeing a growing trend in both countries towards
greater use of identity theft as a means of furthering or facilitating other types of crime.97
Some hard facts are tendered, but they are relatively sparse: in the U.S., identity theft
complaints reported to the Federal Trade Commission increased from 86,212 in 2001 to
161,836 in 2002 to 214,905 in 2003. In Canada, PhoneBusters national call centre received
7,629 identity theft cases in 2002 and 14,526 in 2003.9' Both reflect a growth in identity theft
figures, to be sure, but neither gives information on what document provided the original
theft.
The only other evidence the Alberta government provides is also slight. Pendleton reports
on two specific instances of identity theft leading to arrests in the U.S. In the first, an
9 Ibid. (Evidence, affidavit of Joseph Mark Pendleton at para. 21 [Pendleton Affidavit]).
9 Pendleton Affidavit, ibid at 127, 129 (Exhibit C, Bi-national Working Group on Cross-Border Mass
Marketing Fraud, Identity Theft: A Report to the Minister ofPublic Safety andEmergency Preparedness
Canada and the Attorney General of the United States (October 2004), online: Public Safety Canada
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/le/bs/report-eng.aspx>).
9 Pendleton Affidavit, ibid at 187 (Exhibit G, PhoneBusters statistics on identity theft complaints made
to PhoneBusters 2002 and 2003, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Ontario Provincial Police).
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impersonator had, sometime in 2002, renewed an Alberta woman's driver's licence (not a
Hutterite woman) without the latter's knowledge, taken it to Las Vegas, and apparently used
it as identification when she was arrested on prostitution charges." The second involved a
situation shrouded in "governmental secrecy." As Pendleton describes it in his affidavit:
Although I am unable to discuss the circumstance in any detail because I received information from the
RCMP subject to security classifications that do not permit it, in 1999 a false Alberta driver's licence was
issued to an individual who several years later was arrested in the United States while attempting to carry
out a terrorist attack.o10
Again, there is no suggestion that the Hutterites were involved in this. More important, in
both of these examples, the licences were not photoless, which lessens the impact of the
Alberta government's argument.
Some of the figures Pendleton produces are doubtlessly important. But all told, the
evidence suffers from a few failings. First, the two specific examples tell us nothing about
the governmental need for mandatory photographs on driver's licences. In particular, the so-
called terrorist case where a person has been arrested - a case which is more than six years
old and comes with no evidence of conviction - hardly provides a pressing and substantial
reason for requiring photographs on licences. There is simply not enough information to
show how a photo on a driver's licence would have prevented any of the harms alleged. In
fact, much of the Alberta government's justification for the mandatory photograph seems
targeted to placate the U.S. The universal digital photo licence may, the government claimed,
obviate the need for passports at border crossings and ensure the free flow of goods across
the Canada-U.S. border.' 0
Second, the statistics may be useful, but are not determinative. Reporting of matters is
only one step in the process. How many of these reports turned out to be true? Where are the
actual criminal statistics ofwrongdoing? Pendleton's evidence is that "[t]wenty-five criminal
investigations have resulted since the introduction of facial recognition software in ...
2004."'02 That is hardly evidence of an epidemic.
This leads to a third concern. Figures based on rates of growth can tell a story, but gross
figures are equally significant, and qualitative descriptions are also important. It would be
extremely useful to know, for instance, how many of the over 14,000 calls received by
PhoneBusters in 2003 were legitimate, and how many were nuisance or false identity theft
reports (just as with fire alarms, there must be some cases where a false positive occurs).
How many ended up being prosecuted, or provided proof of fraud? How serious were the
9 Pendleton Affidavit, ibid. at para. 32.
to Ibid. at para. 33.
101 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta (2007), 460 A.R. 293 (note) (Evidence, affidavit of
Shaun Hammond, Assistant Deputy Minister of Transport, Safety Services Division, as part of Alberta's
Application for Leave to Appeal at paras. 2-3); letter from John MacDonald, President, Canadian
Council of Motor Transport Administrators (CCMTA) to the United States Department of Homeland
Security (27 October 2005) at 2, where the CCMTA hoped that "enhanced" driver's licences will
become acceptable documents for entry into both the U.S. and Canada, allowing "[t]he ability for people
and goods to pass quickly," as such travel is "vital for the economies of both countries."
102 Pendleton Affidavit, supra note 96 at para. 17.
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claims that were reported? Were they mainly underage teenagers hoping to buy alcohol, or
were they something different? None ofthe evidence helped determine these basic questions.
A fourth and final concern is probably the most serious. Should we trust the government's
own evidence to justify breaches of rights? Would it not be better to have some independent
verification? The RCMP has recently come under severe attack for blindly adhering to a
policy of Taser use, when there is at least some very credible independent evidence of the
harms it can cause.'03 Is PhoneBusters any better? Is there not some academic criminological
study that could shed light on the "growing incidence of identity theft"?
In the end, the Court was, as the Globe and Mail hinted in an editorial published shortly
after the decision, too enamoured of the government's data.'" The majority simply rode
roughshod over the gaps and holes in the government's case, accepting that "Alberta's
evidence demonstrates the ways in which the existence of an exemption from the photo
requirement would increase the vulnerability of the licensing system and the risk of identity-
related fraud.""os
It is not the first time that the Supreme Court has exhibited a slight case of technophilia.'06
In Society ofComposers, Authors and Music Publishers ofCanada v. Canadian Association
ofInternet Providers,'o the Court held that Parliament did not intend the Copyright Act'o
to have the effect of making internet intermediaries (such as internet service providers)
"users" so as to be subject to royalties for copyright infringement. Justice Binnie, for the
majority, acknowledged the new world we live in, where, because of the near instantaneous
effect of the internet, a company in Bangalore is as easy for Canadians to reach as one in
Mississauga." He discussed the finer points of internet protocols and delivery mechanisms,
exhibiting a detailed, technical knowledge of the engineering behind the internet."s0 He
recognized difficult areas of conflict between technology and law in
trying to apply national laws to a fast-evolving technology that in essence respects no national boundaries....
The issue of global forum shopping for actions for Internet torts has scarcely been addressed. The availability
of child pornography on the Internet is a matter of serious concern. E-commerce is growing. Internet liability
is thus a vast field where the legal harvest is only beginning to ripen.Ill
The entire decision showed an exquisite, almost un-court like, appreciation of technology in
general, and its internet manifestation in particular. In contrast, in R. v. Bryan,"2 a 2007 case
103 See also Braidwood Commission on Conducted Energy Weapon Use, Restoring Public Confidence:
Restricting the Use of Conducted Energy Weapons in British Columbia (Victoria: Braidwood
Commission on Conducted Energy Weapon Use, 2009), online: Braidwood Inquiry <http://www.
braidwoodinquiry.ca/report>.
"No real risk of identity theft," Editorial, The Globe and Mail (28 July 2009) A 10 ["No real risk"].105 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at para. 50.
06 One of the authors has previously written about the Court's recent love-hate relationship with
technology: see Richard Haigh, "The Technology of Political Communication: R. v. Bryan and the
Knowledgeable Voter in the 21st Century" (2008) 42 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 91.
107 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 [SOCAN].
1os R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
' SOCAN, supra note 107 at para. 1.
110 Ibid at paras. 17-26.
" Ibid. at para. 41.
112 2007 SCC 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527.
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involving the threatened use of the internet to provide east-coast election results to the rest
of the country before their polls closed, the majority seemed scared of, or ill-informed about,
the world of modem technology. Justice Fish, on behalf of the majority, seemed positively
antediluvian when he described telephone and email as "modern communications
technology."' " There was no awareness of social networking software, texting, or other more
rapid and widespread forms of "guerrilla" communication. As Richard Haigh notes, the
Court apparently
throws up its hands in ... surrender, refusing to acknowledge the enormous impact current technology has
on the social and cultural ordering of society.
[It ignores] social network websites such as Facebook, MySpace, Flickr, Friendster, LinkedIn, Bebo and
Twitter [as] important communicative tools today.
By standing on a principle of informational equality, in the midst of today's culture of information sharing,
[the Court] ends up standing on an island in a tsunami. If not yet precarious, this is a position that cannot long
remain viable.' 14
In Wilson Colony, the Court seems to continue this disturbing trend, so much so that our
newspapers are now aware of it. As the Globe and Mail reported:
The court seemed strangely in thrall to Alberta's digital facial-recognition technology, and accepted the need
for a perfect, identity-theft-proof system.
Religious freedom is by no means absolute, but Canadians should not necessarily have to bow before the god
of technology, either."t5
The paper has a point. For the majority, the problem of identity theft is nothing short of a
technological pandemic. In fact, the term "identity theft" is referenced over 30 times in the
majority's decision. Many of those attest to its seriousness:
.a growing problem in Alberta and the country
.a serious and growing problem in Alberta and elsewhere
.a social problem that has grown exponentially in terms of cost to the community
... an emerging and challenging problem.
The Alberta government's statistics are used to reinforce this view.
"1 Ibid. at para. 79 [emphasis added].
114 Supra note 106 at 102-104 [footnotes omitted].
115 "No real risk," supra note 104.
116 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at paras. 1, 9, 37, 56, respectively.
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And as the majority inflates the reliability and significance of the Alberta government's
evidence, it simultaneously downplays the important effects that the denial of an exemption
will have on the Wilson Colony. As Jonnette Watson Hamilton argues, the cost of not being
able to hold a driver's licence is, for the Wilson Colony, not "merely the cost of not being
able to drive on the highway,""' or even the financial cost of hiring non-colony members as
drivers. Rather, Watson Hamilton's survey of the literature relating to Hutterite groups"
suggests that Hutterian communal survival depends, in large measure, on colonies' abilities
to control the terms of their engagement with non-Hutterites. If the Wilson Colony is forced
to hire outside drivers, it loses some of this autonomy and, in its view, risks the assimilation
that it deliberately avoids for religious reasons. Further, as Watson Hamilton astutely
observes, the majority's analysis takes insufficient account of the religious aspect of the
Wilson Colony's economic activities. For the Colony, the community members who drive
the trucks bearing Hutterite agricultural products are contributing to the self-sufficiency that
is seen as the community's "ark of salvation." The potentially grave costs to the Wilson
Colony are undervalued in the majority's analysis, further calling into question the reliability
of its cost-benefit calculations.
2. COMPETING STATISTICS AND THE DISSENTING VIEW:
How TO CALCULATE THINGS DIFFERENTLY
Although the majority treated the problem of identity theft as a serious social ill and, on
the basis of the province's evidence, linked the prevention of this problem to the use of
photos on driver's licences, the evidence was not one-sided. In fact, the claimants and
religious freedom interveners provided as much, if not more, hard data than the Alberta
government. In their separate facta, both the Wilson Colony and the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association (CCLA) attempted to show the miniscule impact of retaining the religious
exemption. The Colony presented a loose set of calculations, which it based on the number
of non-photo licences existing during the two-week period between issuing a temporary
(non-photo) licence and receipt of a person's official (photo) licence." 9 They are as follows:
the current 2,394,917 valid driver's licences are valid for five years. Assume that an average
of one-fifth, or 478,983, are renewed each year. If it is further assumed that these renewals
are distributed evenly throughout the year, 18,422 new non-photo temporary licences are
issued every two weeks. Since the average time taken to receive a final licence complete with
11 Jonnette Watson Hamilton, "Controlling Entry into the Marketplace in Order to Exercise of Freedom
of Religion," ABlawg (17 August 2009), online: The University of Calgary Faculty of Law Blog on
Developments in Alberta Law <http://ablawg.ca/2009/08/17/controlling-entry-into-the-marketplace-in-
order-to-exercise-of-freedom-of-religion/>.
"1 See Alvin J. Esau, The Courts and the Colonies: The Litigation of Hutterite Church Disputes(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); William Janzen, Limits on Liberty: The Experience of Mennonite,
Hutterite, andDoukhobor Communities in Canada (Toronto: UniversityofToronto Press, 1990); Robert
Macdonald, "The Hutterites in Alberta" in Howard Palmer & Tamara Palmer, eds., Peoples ofAlberta:
Portraits ofCulturalDiversity (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1985)348; Howard Palmer,
Land of the Second Chance: A History ofEthnic Groups in Southern Alberta (Lethbridge: Lethbridge
Herald, 1972); Douglas E. Sanders, "The Hutterites: A Case Study in Minority Rights" (1964) 42 Can.
Bar Rev. 225.
'9 Supra note 6 (Factum of the Respondents at para. 108 [Respondents]). In the Wilson Colony factum,
where a version of these calculations was carried out, the calculations were based on a two week average
period between issuance of a temporary licence and receipt of its permanent form. In fact, the Alberta
regulations allow any temporary licence to be valid for 30 days, so the figures quoted in this paragraph
could be even higher. Counsel for the Wilson Colony chose a two-week period as a reasonable average
time in which any given temporary licence is in use.
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photo is about two weeks, it is safe to assume that approximately 18,000 non-photo licences
are in circulation at any given time.120 The CCLA looked at the relative order of magnitude
of Hutterite licences to others. It calculated that as of20 May 2003, when the categorical rule
forbidding any Code G exemptions to photo licences was imposed, there were a total of 453
Code G licences out of more than 2.5 million licences in Alberta. Of these 453, 56 percent
were issued to Hutterites, which amounts to 0.01 percent of issued licences. On this basis,
restoring the religious exemption would preserve photos on 99.99 percent ofAlberta driver's
licences. 12 1 Taken together, these numbers are significant. Under the Alberta government's
own regime, 0.77 percent of licences are susceptible to identity theft simply because delayed
accreditation means that 18,422 temporary photoless licences out of a total of 2,394,917 are
in circulation, whereas only 0.01 percent of licences are susceptible to identity theft due to
permanent exemptions. The difference is substantial - there are almost 80 times more
licences in circulation without photos because of the normal processes of licence renewal
than the number of additional photoless licences that would arise if the Hutterites were given
the exemption.122
If the problem of overall identity theft is as serious as the Alberta government made it out
to be, why not work on fixing the time lag between the granting of a temporary licence and
receipt of the permanent form? Or why not change the regulations so that temporary licences
are forbidden? The very existence of temporary, photoless licences raises an interesting
point, neglected in Pendleton's evidence: if, as he states, associations such as the Canadian
Council of Motor Sport Administrators (CCMSA) and the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) will soon make photo licences mandatory, why allow
temporary photoless licences at all? Is there, in fact, an exemption for this period? If so, on
what basis? If not, why does Alberta choose to ignore this aspect of the CCMSA and
AAMVA requirements? To put all this in perspective, it seems to us that one identifiable
problem (identity theft through exploitation of temporary licences) that is 77 times more
likely than another problem (identity theft through illegally obtaining Hutterite licences)
might require some government involvement. If "pressing and substantial" and "minimal
impairment" are to have any meaning, one would hope that some weighing of relative
priorities should occur.
In sum, the cost-benefit analysis carried out by the majority is unstable at best. It is
rendered unreliable by the inflated benefits ascribed to the mandatory photo requirement,
which are not put in proper perspective by taking into account all relevant factors. The costs
of continuing the province's practice of granting an exemption to Hutterites who object to
having their photos taken are overstated, especially considering that the risks to the integrity
120 Respondents, ibid.
121 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 (Factum of the Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association
at para. 9).
122 18,422/2,394,917 = 0.77 percent; 453x56%/2,394,917 = 0.01 percent. Of course, there is no way of
knowing whether the period during which a temporary licence is in operation presents exactly the same
risk of theft (on any given day) as a permanent licence, so the figure of77 times the likelihood represents
the worst case. Sophisticated thieves, for example, may spend time tracking the behaviour of potential
targets, which would mean that temporary licence holders are at a lesser risk. On this, two points are
worth noting, however: (1) that the near 80 times difference is significant, and not likely overborne
completely by differences between a permanent and temporary licence; and (2) all photoless licences,
regardless of the time spent in circulation, can be stolen, so a worst-case scenario seems to reflect the
type of policy approach advocated by Alberta.
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of the driver's licensing system inherent in the system itself far overshadow the risks
attributable to a photo exemption for Hutterite drivers. Moreover, the costs to the Hutterite
community are minimized, and their constitutionally protected freedom of religion is given
short shrift.
In contrast, the dissenting judgment of Abella J. views the benefits of the system urged
by the province in a more critical light. For example, she notes that, on the evidence, the
universal photo requirement is "hardly fool-proof' and that there was no evidence presented
by the province that the existing exemption for Hutterites had caused any harm to the
integrity of the driver's licensing system.'23 Further, Abella J. puts the number of Hutterites
who would likely seek an exemption from the photo requirement into the larger context of
the approximately 700,000 Albertans who do not have driver's licences.'24 This underscores
that the benefits claimed by the province in combatting identity theft are likely exaggerated.
In weighing the costs of the scheme, Abella J.'s judgment is more sensitive to the actual
impact ofthe mandatory photo requirement on the Hutterite community. She emphasizes that
the inability to hold driver's licences will threaten the Wilson Colony's ability to operate
autonomously and self-sufficiently. This, for Abella J., is an element of their religious faith.
Thus, an impediment to self-sufficiency is, in this case, a limit on freedom of religion.'25
On the whole, Abella J. found that the costs significantly outweighed the benefits. To put
it in McConnell and Posner's terms, the government's objective was not sufficiently
compelling to warrant the limit that the regulation imposes on freedom of religion. It is
perhaps LeBel J., who wrote a separate dissenting opinion, who sums it up best:
Other approaches to identity fraud might be devised that would fall within a reasonable range of options and
that could establish a proper balance between the social and constitutional interests at stake. This balance
cannot be obtained by belittling the impact of the measures on the beliefs and religious practices of the
Hutterites and by asking them to rely on taxi drivers and truck rental services to operate their farms and to
preserve their way of life. Absolute safety is probably impossible in a democratic society. A limited
restriction on the Province's objective of minimizing identity theft would not unduly compromise this aspect
of the security of Alberta residents and might lie within the range of reasonable and constitutional
alternatives. Indeed, the Province's stated purpose is not set in stone and does not need to be achieved at all
costs. 126
In our view, the cost-benefit analysis carried out by the dissenting judges seems more
accurate in this case, as it neither exaggerates the benefits of the regulation nor minimizes
its costs.
Despite arguing earlier that a cost-benefit framework may encourage settlement, we
recognize that negotiated solutions are not always feasible. In such cases, where liberty
claims become the only way to resolve a problem, there is a risk, as illustrated in Wilson
Colony, that judges may have difficulty understanding religious claims in terms of costs and
123 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at paras. 155-56.
124 Ibid. at para. 158.
125 Ibid. at paras. 164-70.
126 Ibid at para. 201.
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benefits. There is, however, another possibility under s. 2(a) of the Charter that could also
open up a form ofjudicial dialogue, or at least allow room to deepen judicial understanding.
It is a rarely used but distinct feature of s. 2(a) of the Charter: the guarantee of freedom of
conscience. We turn to that next.
IV. DETERMINING CONSCIENCE UNDER THE CHARTER
A. A FRESH LOOK AT RELIGIOUS CLAIMS
Almost from the Charter's beginnings in 1982, a constant theme in s. 2(a) jurisprudence
has been a relative lack of consideration given to the word "conscience" as a fundamental
freedom. Our hope is that this will change.
It is a fact that most judges in Canada come from a religious and cultural background that
is likely Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish.127 This need not be a problem - as Mark Modak-
Truran argues, recognizing religious convictions as a "silent prologue" to ajudge's decision-
making should be seen as perfectly normal. What he proposes is a clear demarcation between
ajudge's deliberation (where religious convictions can inform) and ajudge's written opinion
(where religious beliefs should not be relied upon).128 In theory, this approach has much to
commend it. The difficulty, of course, is in knowing what a judge thinks while deliberating.
Perhaps subconsciously, it is easier for judges to turn down religious freedom claims where
the religious practice strays further from the orthodox, is removed from, or outside of, their
own experience (as far as we are aware, for example, there has never been a Hutterite judge
in Canada).
One way to alleviate this tendency is to think of all religious claims (or at least the
significant number of them that can be described as individual autonomy, liberty-based
claims) as belonging under the umbrella ofconscience. Religious liberty is a distinct category
of conscience-based liberty.129 Framed in this way, it may be possible for judges to re-
imagine these claims, making it easier for them to engage in the imaginative thinking that is
127 Statistics on the religious backgrounds of Canadian judges are not available, but we expect results to be
not wildly dissimilar from those in the U.S. A useful source for the U.S. statistics is Adherents.com,
which lists the religious affiliation of all U.S. Supreme Court justices (up to 2005): Adherents.com,
"Religious Affiliation of the U.S. Supreme Court," online: Adherents.com
<http://www.adherents.com/adhsc. html>. The list shows that thejudges belong to a few main religious
groups, mostly Christian: Episcopalian (32.4 percent), Presbyterian (17.6 percent), Catholic (10.2
percent), Unitarian (9.3 percent), Jewish (6.4 percent), Methodist (4.6 percent), Baptist (2.7 percent),
Congregationalist (1.9 percent), Disciples of Christ (1.9 percent), Lutheran (0.9 percent), Quaker (0.9
percent), Huguenot (0.9 percent), Protestant (not further defined) (12 percent), and not a member of any
church (0.9 percent). The site also notes that some major religions that have never been represented on
the U.S. Supreme Court include Pentecostals, Mormons, Muslims, Buddhists, Jehovah's Witnesses,
Mennonites, and Eastern Orthodox. The site also lists the religious affiliation of Canadian Prime
Ministers, but not judges.
128 See Mark C. Modak-Truran, "Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision
Making" (2004) 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 709.
129 But see Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense ofAmerica's Tradition ofReligious
Equality (New York: Basic Books, 2008) at 168-73. Nussbaum offers a slightly different account.
Similar to our claims, she argues that freedom of conscience should be a guiding concept. However, she
follows Roger Williams to define conscience as "the faculty with which each person searches for the
ultimate meaning of life" (at 168). This faculty "is of intrinsic worth and value, and is worthy of respect
whether the person is using it well or badly" (at 168-69). Nussbaum recognizes that this formulation may
work an unfairness against non-religious persons because the notion of an ultimate truth may itself have
religious undertones. She suggests that such unfairness be mitigated "by extending the account of
religion as far as we can, compatibly with administrability" (at 173).
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evident in the best judges - to put oneself in someone else's conscientious shoes, for
example, is easier than putting oneself in someone else's religious shoes 30 - we are all
imbued with our own idea of conscience. The Supreme Court in Wilson Colony takes an
incremental step in this direction; we hope to convince it to go further in the future.
B. "CONSCIENCE" IN WILSON COLONY
It is interesting that, though the case centred directly on a matter of religion, the two main
opinions take time out to remind us that the s. 2(a) right contains conscience in addition to
religion. Justice LeBel, in a separate dissenting opinion, also offers his own provocative
reading of s. 2(a) that points out a possible connection between religion and conscience.
For the majority, McLachlin C.J.C. acknowledges the plethora of different religions and
practices in a pluralist world, and finds that it is "inevitable that some ... will come into
conflict with laws ... of general application."l 3 1 She continues:
[T]his pluralistic context also includes "atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned." Their interests
are equally protected by s. 2(a). In judging the seriousness of the limit in a particular case, the perspective
of the religious or conscientious claimant is important.13 2
On its face, the majority's recognition ofthis right ofconscience is uncontroversial; it merely
reflects the reality that the non-religious may also find protection under s. 2(a), albeit one that
may also be overborne by legitimate government interests. A more favourable reading would
see it as part of a slow but steady move to reveal a different kind of s. 2(a) - one seen
clearly by Wilson J. in R. v. Morgentaler,13 but which has been clouded by majority
decisions since. Justice Abella also devotes some space to discussing conscience. Her review
of it is at the same time more conservative and more progressive than the majority's. After
citing Dickson C.J.C.'s oft-quoted statement in Big M that "an emphasis on individual
conscience and individual judgment ... lies at the heart of our democratic political
tradition,"' 34 she goes on to quote him further:
It is the centrality of the rights associated with freedom of individual conscience that
underlies their designation in the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms as "fundamental".
They are the sine qua non of the political tradition underlying the Charter.135
She continues with a number of quotations from Big M and the European Court of Human
Rights in Kokkinakis"' that refer to freedom of conscience and the principle of individual
conscience. So, one could say that she offers nothing new regarding conscience, relying
1o See e.g. Multani, supra note 57 at paras. 37-41, 71,74,76,79. The kind of imaginative thinking we have
in mind is that displayed, for example, by Charron J.'s understanding of the importance of a kirpan to
the Sikh religion.
" Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at para. 90.
132 Ibid., citing Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993), 260A E.C.H.R. I (Ser. A.), 17 E.H.R.R. 397 [Kokkinakis].
13 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [Morgentaler].
134 Big M, supra note 74 at 346.
135 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at para. 127, citing ibid.
36 Kokkinakis, supra note 132.
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heavily on past Supreme Court precedent, and less so on European jurisprudence. That she
reminds us of the Court's earlier discussions on conscience, however, is important in itself
(it is unfortunate, perhaps, that she did not refer to Wilson J.'s exegesis on conscience in
Morgentaler'37 ). She also, therefore, seems to be signalling a similar message of openness
to future discussions on conscience.
It is LeBel J., however, who is the most enigmatic, displaying unease with the entire
concept of the s. 2(a) freedom based on religion. In doing so, he exhibits a judicial
humanness that is rare:
Perhaps, courts will never be able to explain in a complete and satisfactory manner the meaning of religion
for the purposes of the Charter. One might have thought that the guarantee of freedom of opinion, freedom
of conscience, freedom of expression and freedom of association could very well have been sufficient to
protect freedom of religion. But the framers of the Charter thought fit to incorporate into the Charter an
express guarantee of freedom of religion, which must be given meaning and effect.13 8
This is a very telling statement. It seems as if LeBel J. is wishing that freedom of religion did
not have to exist. For him, certainly, the other fundamental freedoms contained in s. 2 almost
cover the field of religion by proxy. To those of us who wish for a resurrection of freedom
of conscience, it gives an impetus of hope. In our view, "conscience" is the broader category
of morality-based freedom, under which most individual claims of religious freedom could
be grouped. And "conscience," as an independent freedom, begins with the text of the
Charter.
C. A GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
OF CONSCIENCE
Basic principles of statutory interpretation favour granting conscience independent status.
Elmer Driedger's famous "one principle" approach says that legislative words should be read
in their grammatical and ordinary sense in harmony with their context.' Each word in
legislation is normally considered important, and uniformity and consistency are valued over
stylistic variation and aesthetic appeal.'40 On this broad premise, conscience deserves being
treated separately from religion.
Two linguistic canons of construction bear examination in the context of s. 2(a). The first
is the presumption against the use of superfluous or meaningless words. Every legislative
word is important and presumed to have a specific role to play in advancing government's
purpose.' 4' The rule applies to individual words within a phrase, but also between parts of
a legislative scheme. Thus, words that appear in one section of a statute are assumed to mean
'n Supra note 133 at 37-38.
13 Wilson Colony (S.C.C.), supra note 6 at para. 180.
'3 See Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 2002) at 20ff.
14 Ibid. at 151.
141 Ibid. at 158. See also F.A.R. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths,
2002) at 993; Randal N. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 2001) at 106-107. As Graham puts it, drafters are assumed never to use extraneous
language and guard against the use of multiple, redundant words that may create confusion.
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the same elsewhere. The opposite is also true: words that appear in one place together but do
not appear in another place together are therefore intended to do different things.
All common law courts have approved this presumption. A straightforward example is the
case of A-G's Reference (No. I of 1975) where the English Court of Appeal held that the
words "aid, abet, counsel or procure" must each have a distinct meaning since otherwise
Parliament would be indulging in tautology.'42 In the Supreme Court of Canada, Lamer
C.J.C. in R. v. Proulx pronounced that "[i]t is a well accepted principle of statutory
interpretation that no legislative provision should be interpreted so as to render it mere
surplusage,"'43 and in R. v. Kelly the same Court declared it to be a "trite rule of statutory
interpretation that every word in the statute must be given a meaning."'" The Supreme Court
of Canada also applies the same presumption in its interpretive approaches to the Charter.
Of course, the presumption can be rebutted where the meaning of the additional words is
shown not to be superfluous or that repetition was deliberately intended. If either of two
words could have been used on its own without any change in meaning, it is possible that the
tautology was intended.'45 The argument is much less compelling, however, when dealing
with specific examples of infrequently used constitutional language such as "religion" and
"conscience." To begin with, there are many words more synonymous with religion than
conscience: faith, belief, and worship immediately come to mind. "Creed" is even more
likely, especially given that some statutes employ that term instead of religion.'46 More
compelling still, the importance of every word in a constitutional document cannot be
understated - if anything, surplusage in a constitution simply does not exist.
The other canon of construction that has relevance is the presumption of consistent
expression. Legislative drafters are not stylists - elegant variation is to be avoided at all
costs, taking a "far second place to certainty of meaning."l"' The same words should have
the same meaning and different words should have different meanings. Where a different
form of expression occurs, it is proper to infer that a different meaning is intended.148 As the
Supreme Court noted in R. v. Barnier, "'appreciating' and 'knowing' must be different,
otherwise the Legislature would have employed one or the other only." 49 This presumption
of consistency applies to patterns of expression found in disparate parts of a statute as well.'
Again, it makes sense to treat this presumption as even more forceful in the case of
constitutional provisions.
142 [1975] Q.B. 773 at 779 (C.A.).
143 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 at para. 28.
'" [1992] 2 S.C.R. 170 at 188.
145 Bennion, supra note 141 at 994. Bennion illustrates this idea through reference to a statute which
imposes a duty to "safeguard and protect" the welfare of a child. He argues that the phrase is an example
of surplusage since either term would have been sufficient on its own.
46 See e.g. Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19. Sections 1-6, for example, prevent discrimination
on the basis of creed, but not religion - in other words, "creed" acts as a surrogate for "religion."
14 Bennion, supra note 141 at 995.
148 See Sullivan, supra note 139 at 162-63.
149 [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1124 at 1135-36.
Iso See Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 at para. 60, where, for example, Parliament provides
exclusive jurisdiction to the Admiralty Court by express provision in one section of an Act ("Admiralty
Court has exclusive jurisdiction") it must not intend exclusive jurisdiction where such words are not
used in another section of an Act.
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With this in mind, the inclusion of conscience in s. 2(a) should not be ignored or glossed
over. It is not an elegant variation of religion, redundant, or superfluous. To give the
Charter's terms full meaning, "conscience" must have independent content. In addition,
since "religion" appears in s. 15 without being partnered with conscience, the different
formulations increase the force of the presumption that the intention in s. 2(a) was to give
conscience separate meaning. (Granted, it might be slightly more difficult to conceive of
"conscience" as a ground of discrimination, but that only helps the claim for its
independence.)
Nor is it correct to rely on the maxim noscitur a sociis, which holds that the meaning of
a word can be determined by its association with other words, to restrict the interpretation
of conscience. That maxim aids in containing the possibilities of meanings of words by
providing a context for understanding: Randal Graham's example of the difference between
a single word, "chips," and the phrase "fish and chips" shows how the single word is
changed by circumstance - without "fish and," the word could be taken to mean wood chips
or paint chips."' Clearly, "conscience" should have some connection to religion (its inclusion
in s. 2(a) instead of 2(b), for example, makes this clear), but this does not make it perfectly
synonymous with religion in the same way that "fish" is not synonymous with "chips."
On the basis of proper canons of construction, therefore, there is little doubt that
conscience, as a concept, should be dealt with independently of religion under s. 2(a).
Despite this, few examples of its use occur in Canadian jurisprudence.
D. AN OVERVIEW OF CONSCIENCE
AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
It was not long after the Charter was enacted that freedom of conscience appeared in a
judicial decision. In the first big test of s. 2(a) of the Charter, R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd., 2
Laycraft J.A. at the Alberta Court of Appeal held that freedom of conscience in the Charter
seems designed to include the "rights of those whose fundamental principles are not founded
on theistic belief."' On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada largely ignored the matter of
conscience, since the case was easily (and arguably more properly) decided on the basis of
freedom of religion. Chief Justice Dickson did, however, comment on the possibility of
conscience as an independent right, in the dicta relied on by Abella J. above,' 54 and then
stated:
Religious belief and practice are historically prototypical and, in many ways, paradigmatic of
conscientiously-held beliefs and manifestations and are therefore protected by the Charter. Equally protected,
and for the same reasons, are expressions and manifestations of religious non-belief and refusals to
participate in religious practice.
1ss Graham, supra note 141 at 87.
152 (1983), 49 A.R. 194 (C.A.).
153 Ibid. at para. 42.
154 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
is5 Big M, supra note 74 at 346-47.
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Around the same time, Tarnopolsky J.A. delivered the first comprehensive analysis of the
parameters of conscience as an independent value in his 1984 decision in R. v. Videoflicks
Ltd. 's (a case more famously known by the style of cause adopted on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada, Edwards Books'). At issue was Ontario's response to the legislative void
left by the Supreme Court's striking down of federal Sunday closing legislation (the Lord's
Day Act'58). Justice Tarnopolsky employed an analytical approach familiar from earlier
religious freedom cases, but broadened it to incorporate conscientious belief. Two elements
governed his analysis. First, he recognized that some people attach religious significance to
acts or symbols that do not carry any such meaning for others. He referred to the case of New
York v. Sandstrom's where Lehman J., in a concurring opinion, used the "homely" example
of the "partaking of food" as illustrating a human activity that can take on significant
religious meaning.' Justice Tarnopolsky applied this reasoning to draw out the contours of
conscience:
[E]ssentially the same reasoning would apply to the fundamental freedom of conscience, except that freedom
of conscience would generally not have the same relationship to the beliefs or creed of an organized or at
least collective group of individuals.161
Although he gave no parallel examples, nor developed a method of assessing conscience-
based freedom claims, it is presumed that he might be referring to a vegetarian morally
opposed to eating meat, who may find himself or herself subject to a law or regulation that
failed to provide for a special diet. The second element of Tarnopolsky J.A.'s definition arose
over a concern for the boundaries of the legal concept of conscience. He feared that freedom
of conscience could easily be abused, which meant that, as with religion, it should not apply
to a mere individual act or symbolic statement of any kind, but should be based on a set of
beliefs that is binding on, or at least strongly felt by, someone. Conscience must direct, in a
powerful sense, a person's behaviour. Yet it is also both individualized and compelling. "[I]t
does not follow," Tarnopolsky J.A. wrote, "that one can rely upon the Charter protection of
freedom of conscience to object to an enforced holiday simply because it happens to coincide
with someone else's sabbath." 62 Ultimately, he was prepared to accept that a
businessperson's sincere belief, based solely on conscience, requiring him or her to close
shop on a day other than the Sabbath, could qualify as a matter needing protection under the
conscience branch of s. 2(a)."' In the specific case before him, however, no such evidence
was tendered.
At the Supreme Court, Videoflicks metamorphosed. The conscience branch of s. 2(a) was
discussed in argument, but largely ignored in the decision. Chief Justice Dickson's majority
decision favoured a detailed analysis of religious freedom. He made only a passing reference
to conscience, observing that freedom of religion, unlike freedom of conscience, "has both
156 (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 395 (C.A.) [Videoflicks], aff'd Edwards Books, supra note 43.
157 Edwards Books, ibid
58 R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13.
' 18 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1939).
16 Ibid. at 845.
161 Videoflicks, supra note 156 at 422.
162 Ibid [emphasis added].
63 Ibid.
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individual and collective aspects."'" He also echoed Tarnopolsky J.A.'s concern over the
possible abuse of the conscience branch.'
The only Supreme Court of Canada decision to date that truly engages with the conscience
branch of s. 2(a) is Wilson J.'s concurring opinion in Morgentaler, decided two years after
Edwards Books. This case was Dr. Henry Morgentaler's first attack on the constitutionality
of the abortion provisions of the Criminal Code.'" The majority found that the provisions
offended s. 7 of the Charter and struck them down.
Justice Wilson agreed but for different reasons, including a finding that the provisions
offended s. 2(a) of the Charter. Her opinion contains a lengthy exposition on the nature of
conscience and its relationship to religion. Taking note of Dickson C.J.C.'s broad and
expansive approach to Charter interpretation that began with Big M, she quoted at length
from the passage cited above, noting that individual conscience is central to western notions
of human rights and freedoms, to our democratic traditions, and to notions of dignity.' She
ended the reference by concluding that Dickson C.J.C. takes religion as simply an example,
albeit a primary one, of a "conscientiously-held belief.""' This theme was then expanded
upon:
I do not think [Dickson C.J.C.] is saying that a personal morality which is not founded in religion is outside
the protection of s. 2(a). Certainly, it would be my view that conscientious beliefs which are not religiously
motivated are equally protected by freedom of conscience in s. 2(a).
It seems to me, therefore, that in a free and democratic society "freedom of conscience and religion" should
be broadly construed to extend to conscientiously-held beliefs, whether grounded in religion or in a secular
morality. Indeed, as a matter of statutory interpretation, "conscience" and "religion" should not be treated
as tautologous if capable of independent, although related, meaning.169
Justice Wilson found that the abortion provisions of the Criminal Code endorsed one value
(the state forbidding a pregnant woman certain options) at the expense of another (a woman's
right to choose). A woman's right to choose, however, is constitutionally protected by the
freedom of conscience guarantee in s. 2(a). "[T]he decision whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy," Wilson J. concluded, "is essentially a moral decision, a matter of conscience ...
[which] must be the conscience of the individual."'
Another opportunity to engage with the meaning of freedom of conscience arose a few
years later in 1993. The Supreme Court had occasion to decide whether the assisted suicide
64 Edwards Books, supra note 43 at 78 1.
165 Ibid at 760-61, citing Videoflicks, supra note 156 at 422.
66 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
67 Morgentaler, supra note 133 at 176, citing Big M, supra note 74 at 345-47.
6 Morgentaler, ibid. at 177-78. She fails to highlight the somewhat depressing end to Dickson C.J.C.'s
sentence quoted from Big M at supra note 155, where he states that "other sorts of governmental
involvement in matters having to do with religion" [emphasis added] which seems to bring back the
requirement of a nexus between conscience and religion.
169 Morgentaler, ibid at 178-79.
170 Ibid. at 175-76.
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provisions of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional in Rodriguez v. British Columbia
(A.G.)."' On the face of it, this seemed like a perfect case to articulate a conceptual
understanding of freedom of conscience. Although the decision to terminate life is not likely
to fit within religious freedom, since many religious tenets seek to preserve the sanctity of
life, it could well fall within a matter of one's conscience to determine when life ends. As
Ronald Dworkin has argued, the conviction that human life is sacred, through our
conscience, may paradoxically be a compelling reason to allow euthanasia.172
Surprisingly, conscience-based arguments were not invoked by most of the key
participants in the litigation. At trial, the only Charter provisions in issue were ss. 7, 12, and
15. These remained the only grounds at issue on appeal. During oral argument at the
Supreme Court, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. raised a question for the interveners, the Canadian
Conference of Catholic Bishops, that hinted of a possible role for conscience to play. She
seemed disappointed by its absence from debate:
I suppose you agree with whatever faith you represent that there is a freedom of conscience here. So, is it
not a conscience decision? Your own conscience dictates what you are going to - so nobody has gone into
that area too much. Nobody has discussed that.' 73
The answer was non-committal; L'Heureux-Dub6 J. did not push the point further.
Unfortunately, these few hints and opportunities were largely swept aside when it came
to the decision itself Writing for himself in dissent, Lamer C.J.C. casually referred to the
importance of freedom of conscience just twice; the majority did not refer to it at all. For
Lamer C.J.C., the question of whether choosing suicide is a right should be answered while
"keeping in mind that the Charter has established the essentially secular nature of Canadian
society and the central place of freedom of conscience in the operation of our institutions."' 74 He
followed this by quoting, with approval, Dickson C.J.C.'s statement in Big M that individual
conscience "lies at the heart of our democratic political tradition."' Both are fine statements of
purpose; however, he failed to take the concept any further. From the standpoint of using
euthanasia to develop a concept of conscience-based freedom, the decision in Rodriguez is a
disappointment. It could have offered much more to the discussion. In the end, perhaps the only
legacy that the case leaves for freedom of conscience comes from Sue Rodriguez herself. In
her testimony at trial, she made a plea that only makes sense on the basis of conscience:
Q: Why do you want to be able to exercise your right to commit suicide with the assistance of a physician?
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 [Rodriguez].172 See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual
Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), especially c. 7.
73 Rodriguez, supra note 171 (Oral argument, intervener, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops at
182).
174 Rodriguez, ibid. at 553. See also lain T. Benson, "Notes Towards a (Re)definition of the 'Secular'
(2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 519 at 535, where Benson argues that Lamer C.J.C. gives no definition to the
concept the "secular" and cites no authority for his position. Benson suggests that the Charter's history
and preamble support a contrary view to Lamer C.J.C.'s.
"7 Big M, supra note 74 at 346, cited in Rodriguez, ibid. at 554.
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A: I feel that it's my right, and I want to die with dignity. I just feel that inner guidance tells me that it is the
ight thing for me to do and I should be allowed to do that.17 6
Perhaps "inner guidance" is all that can be said about what conscience is, and how it is both
similar to, and different from, religion.
B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto 7 was another case where
freedom of conscience played a significant role. There, a litigant challenged the Ontario
Child Welfare Act"' provisions that allow the state to deem certain children to be in need of
protection. The case involved a minor, Sheena B., who was given blood transfusions during
a surgical procedure, contrary to the family's beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses. The parents
claimed, amongst other things, that the Child Welfare Act provisions contravened s. 2(a) of
the Charter. Justices Major and lacobucci for the minority found that, while the parents may
feel that they have a religious right to prevent a blood transfusion, there is an equal and
opposite infringement upon a minor's freedom of conscience, which "arguably includes the
right to live long enough to make one's own reasoned choice about the religion one wishes
to follow as well as the right not to hold a religious belief."" Thus, freedom of conscience
could, in the right circumstances, be used to negate freedom of religion and vice versa. This
reasoning clearly gives some independent meaning to "conscience." As a minority view,
however, it has received little support or mention since it was delivered.
Last, notions of conscientious freedom surfaced in Amselem, the succah case discussed
above which involved religious freedom under the Quebec Charter of human rights andfreedoms.'5 The majority of the Court noted that only "beliefs, convictions and practices
rooted in religion" are protected from the guarantee of freedom of religion. These should be
kept separate from practices that are "secular, socially based or conscientiously held."'
Although this may be taken as acknowledging conscience as something independent from
religion, it is a weak endorsement at best. It is certainly a far cry from Wilson J.'s eloquent
call for conscience as a distinct branch of s. 2(a) in Morgentaler. So where are we after
Wilson Colony?
E. AN INDEPENDENT "CONSCIENCE"?
Richard Moon argues that after the Supreme Court of Canada's wide-ranging discussion
in Amselem, the protection granted to conscience seems to be of a lower order than that of
religion, despite its apparently equal footing in s. 2(a) of the Charter.82 In his view, the
Court has determined that religious beliefs and practices are different from secular ones,
deserve special protection and accommodation, and can only be restricted for compelling
reasons. It is highly unlikely, he argues, that any court will extend protection to any belief
or practice that "an individual might consider important or valuable, but not obligatory," and
176 Rodriguez, ibid. (Oral argument, appellant).177 [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 [B.(R.)].
178 R.S.O. 1980, c. 66, as rep. by S.O. 1984, c. 55, s. 208.
179 B.(R.), supra note 177.
o8 R.S.Q. c. C-12.1 Amselem, supra note 46 at para. 39.182 Richard Moon, "Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem" (2005) 29 Sup.
Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 201.
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that does not have some connection to moral duty.18 3 For Moon, what may make religion
special, and different from "mere" conscience, is that religious beliefs and practices connect
individuals to cultural communities and are part of deeply-rooted cultural identities.'4
This is a useful distinction, but ultimately insufficient. The individual sincere belief test
developed by the Court in Amselem has given religion a large degree of subjectivity,
reflected largely in individual autonomy. As Benjamin Berger notes, the test makes it
unlikely for Canadian constitutional law to render religion in an image anything other than
individual and private:
There is, of course, a strong connection between law's sense of religion as centrally a matter of individual
autonomy and the translation of religious commitment into matters of preference.. Religion is to be protected
because it is the object of individual choice.... [R]eligion comes out in a shape easily assimilated into a
distinction critical to the liberal political imagination: religion is quintessentially private.185
Moreover, other cultural communities exist that have no connection to religion or religious
practices. Strong communities are created over deeply-rooted identities in sports - avid
hockey and soccer fans the world over (for that matter, many fans of many sports) are both
connected to a community (and it would be easy to see that as a "cultural" community) that
is deeply rooted in their identity. They are part of a tradition that is easily over a century old,
and share in those common histories.186 In Canada, the "national sport" of hockey is the
subject of a number of university courses, most comparing it to a form of organized
religion.' 7 One could guess that the same would hold true for motorcycle gangs such as the
Hell's Angels, ballet companies, or more contemporary online communities such as
"gamers."'"
The introduction of the Charter has changed the socio-political structure and environment
of Canada. The traditional and collectivist legal culture has ceded to a more individualist,
American approach to rights. To some extent, this is what rights talk does (although s. I of
the Charter, especially with the Supreme Court's newfound appreciation in Wilson Colony
183 Ibid. at 215.
84 Ibid. at 216. This would also deal with the problem he sees in the majority decision in Amselem that the
Supreme Court views religious commitment as completely linked to individual choice and subjective
sincerity, making it difficult to distinguish from a non-religious person's sincere and chosen belief (at
219).
' Benjamin L. Berger, "Law's Religion: Rendering Culture" in Richard Moon, ed., Law and Religious
Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 264 at 283. A version of this chapter is also
contained in (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 277.
186 See also Jonathan Franklin, "Maradona the Messiah" The Globe and Mail (13 November 2008) A2. It
is hard not to ignore the idolatry of Diego Maradona, a former superstar soccer player in Argentina who
has inspired La Iglesia Maradoniana -the Church of Maradona - in Buenos Aires, where the faithful
cite their own version of the Lord's Prayer: "Our Diego, Who art on earth, Hallowed be thy left foot,
Thy magic come, Thy goals be remembered."
1 Carly Weeks, "Holy hockey sticks! Our national sport is like an organized religion, according to a
university course that will examine our fervour for the game" The Globe and Mail (24 October 2008)
L3.
1 See Josh Wingrove, "Couple says son's disappearance has to do with video game" The Globe and Mail
(21 October 2008), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/
article7l7428.ece>. A sad case of recent occurrence is that of Brandon Crisp, a young boy from Barrie,
Ontario, who died after running away from home, ostensibly because his parents refused to allow him
to continue playing video games, fearing that he was addicted. In the initial days following his
disappearance, speculation was that he had fallen prey to a "gaming community" who kidnapped him,
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of the final proportionality arm of Oakes, makes some attempt to bring collective goals into
the debate). What is not so clear-cut, however, is how the communitarian aspects of religious
practice can survive and flourish in an environment that denies, or at least reduces,
connectedness. This fear has been well-expressed by Canadian psychoanalyst Charles Levin:
[The function of religion] has been taken over by legalistic liberalism, the rule of law, and the entrenched
principles of ... due process, freedom of conscience ... equal opportunity, and so on. To a variable extent,
liberal democracies both create and reflect this novel circumstance of social relativity. Under these
conditions, religion like everything else must be satisfied to compete in a game which has no final winner.
In functional terms, it is now just another commodity, another social or political trend, another "lifestyle
choice" to be wondered about and polled and televised and marketed but never absolutely embraced because
- thank God - we are now protected by Constitutional Law even from our own deepest wishes.189
It would not be wise to presume that accentuating conscience at the expense of religion will
transform us and take us to a time where we retain the best of both worlds - a strong sense
of shared, but fully multicultural and pluralist, community, coupled with an idealized
protection of individual rights and freedoms. Yet relying on conscience, as a freedom in its
own right apart from religion, could smooth some of these rough edges identified by Levin.
It may allow religion, using his metaphors, to turn away from its own commodification, leave
the game, and be embraced again on its own terms. "Conscience," as an independent
freedom, may help bring back the very point of having religion and religious freedom. By
insinuating that the idea of conscience as an independent right remains alive, the Supreme
Court has, in Wilson Colony, returned partway to Wilson J.'s calculation in the Morgentaler
decision. In particular, if LeBel J.'s words can be taken to heart - if freedom of conscience
is not sufficient to protect religion, even in combination with the other s. 2 freedoms - then
the converse could also be true: freedom of religion is insufficient to cover conscientious
freedom, which is why the framers of the Charter thought it necessary to include an express
guarantee of conscience. It should be given its own proper meaning and effect.
V. CONCLUSION
We began with a hypothetical situation, difficult to imagine happening. We end with
something much more real. Suaad Hagi Mohamud spent three months stuck in Kenya
(including eight days in prison) because a KLM employee at Nairobi airport, on the day she
was to fly home to Toronto, thought she did not properly resemble the picture in her
Canadian passport. What followed was an ordeal for Mohamud that did not put Canada in
a good light. All because of human error.190
The digital photo licensing project in Alberta will not remove human error. Digitizing
photographs and facial recognition software aids in narrowing down the pool of potential
duplicate persons, but is currently not sophisticated enough to provide exact matches.
9 Charles Levin, "The Religion Question Answered - Charles Levin" Books in Canada (February 1998),
online: Books in Canada <http://www.booksincanada.com/article-view.asp?id=778>.
19 See "Suaad Hagi Mohamud's detention in Kenya" CBC News (5 October 2009), online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/08/12/f-haji-mohamud-timeline.html>. See also Margaret Wente,
"The strange case of Suaad Mohamud" The Globe and Mail (13 October 2009) Al 9, indicating that the
story may be more complicated.
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According to the Alberta government's own experts, there will always be a need for a human
being to sift through by hand and compare photographs (possibly between ten to 20 faces).
What if mistakes occur? The case of Mohamud shows the effects of false positives,
particularly in an age of apparent digital certainty. If you were found, incorrectly, to have two
driver's licences, who knows what Kafkaesque string of events would follow? Trying to sort
out that problem and convince governmental authorities that you only have one licence will
almost certainly become exponentially more difficult because of the certitude that goes with
"infallible" technology.
The mohel we imagined at the beginning of this article carries out his role in a ritual
designed to recall the traditional Jewish concept of the covenantal relationship between God
and Abraham. The Charter is also a covenant of sorts; it is a set of promises about the basic
parameters of the relationship between the governments and the governed in this country.
The Supreme Court, as the final interpreters of that promise, must ensure that our
governments are faithful to those promises. In our view the Court erred in Wilson Colony by
putting too much faith in technology and the Alberta government's evidence. Although it
engaged in a form of cost-benefit analysis that may be a more appropriate method for
resolving religious conflicts occurring over generally applicable laws, it failed to truly take
into account the costs of difference borne by the Colony.
Moreover, with the Court's pro-government ruling, there is now seemingly no chance that
other Alberta residents will be able to claim that they should be allowed to drive without a
driver's licence photo on the basis that it is against conscience because it "steals one's soul."
Yet, with the Court's continued hints at a role for conscience under s. 2(a), there may come
a time when someone with a fervent, irresistible belief (a nouveau Thoreauvian figure who
needs to spend time communing with nature in a tent on his balcony for a few days per
year?)' is protected from generally applicable laws without having to ground the belief on
a religious basis. We shall see.
The only certainty for now is that the Wilson Colony will never be the same again. They
have been wronged. It is a measure of their fortitude that they will either accept the judgment
and carry on, or make the almost impossible decision to leave the country that has provided
them a large measure of religious freedom for many decades. Only they are able to calculate
what lies ahead for their community.
191 Compare with the situation of Moise Amselem and others in Amselem, supra note 46.
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